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The Regulation of 
Reputational Information 
By Eric Goldman* 
Introduction 
This essay considers the role of reputational information in our marketplace.  It 
explains how well-functioning marketplaces depend on the vibrant flow of 
accurate reputational information, and how misdirected regulation of 
reputational information could harm marketplace mechanisms.  It then explores 
some challenges created by the existing regulation of reputational information 
and identifies some regulatory options for the future.   
Reputational Information Defined 
Typical definitions of “reputation” focus on third-party cognitive perceptions of 
a person.1  For example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines reputation as the “esteem 
in which a person is held by others.”2  Bryan Garner’s A Dictionary of Modern 
Legal Usage defines reputation as “what one is thought by others to be.”3  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence also reflect this perception-centric view of 
“reputation.”4 
                                                     
* Associate Professor and Director, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of  
Law.  Email: egoldman@gmail.com.  Website: http://www.ericgoldman.org.  In 
addition to a stint as General Counsel of  Epinions.com, a consumer review website now 
part of  the eBay enterprise, I have provided legal or consulting advice to some of  the other 
companies mentioned in this essay.  I prepared this essay in connection with a talk at the 
Third Annual Conference on the Law and Economics of  Innovation at George Mason 
University, May 2009. 
1 As one commentator explained: 
Through one’s actions, one relates to others and makes impressions on them.  
These impressions, taken as a whole, constitute an individual’s reputation—
that is, what other people think of  you, to the extent that their thoughts arise 
from what they know about you, or think they know about you. 
 Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamation, 
41 VAL. U.L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2007). 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
3 BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE (1990). 
4 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(19), 803(21). 
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Although this definition is useful so far as it goes, I am more interested in how 
information affects prospective decision-making.5  Accordingly, I define 
“reputational information” as follows: 
information about an actor’s past performance that helps 
predict the actor’s future ability to perform or to satisfy the 
decision-maker’s preferences. 
This definition contemplates that actors create a pool of data (both subjective 
and objective) through their conduct.  This pool of data—the reputational 
information—can provide insights into the actor’s likely future behavior.   
Reputation Systems 
“Reputation systems” aggregate and disseminate reputational information to 
consumers of that information.  Reputation systems can be mediated or 
unmediated.   
In unmediated reputation systems, the producers and consumers of reputational 
information communicate directly.  Examples of unmediated reputation systems 
include word of mouth, letters of recommendation and job references. 
In mediated reputation systems, a third-party publisher gathers, organizes and 
publishes reputational information.  Examples of mediated reputation systems 
include the Better Business Bureau’s ratings, credit reports/scores, investment 
ratings (such as Morningstar mutual fund ratings and Moody bond ratings), and 
consumer review sites.   
The Internet has led to a proliferation of mediated reputation systems, and in 
particular consumer review sites.6  Consumers can review just about anything 
online; examples include: 
 eBay’s feedback forum,7 which allows eBay’s buyers and sellers to rate 
each other. 
 Amazon’s product reviews, which allows consumers to rate and review 
millions of marketplace products. 
 Yelp.com, which allows consumers to review local businesses. 
                                                     
5 Luis M.B. Cabral, The Economics of  Trust and Reputation: A Primer (June 2005 draft), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/reputation/Reputation_June05.pdf (treating 
information about reputation as inputs into Bayesian calculations).  
6 Indeed, this has spurred the formation of  an industry association, the Rating and Review 
Professional Association.  http://www.rarpa.org.  
7 http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html.  
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 TripAdvisor.com, which allows consumers to review hotels and other 
travel attractions. 
 RealSelf.com, which allows consumers to review cosmetic surgery 
procedures. 
 Avvo.com, which allows consumers to rate and review attorneys. 
 Glassdoor.com, which allows employees to share salary information 
and critique the working conditions at their employers. 
 Honestly.com,8 which allows co-workers to review each other. 
 RateMyProfessors.com, which allows students to publicly rate and 
review their professors. 
 DontDateHimGirl.com, which allows people to create and “find 
profiles of men who are alleged cheaters.”9 
 TheEroticReview.com, which allows johns to rank prostitutes.10 
 
Why Reputational Information Matters 
In theory, the marketplace works through an “invisible hand”: consumers and 
producers make individual and autonomous decisions that, without any 
centralized coordination, collectively determine the price and quantity of goods 
and services.  When it works properly, the invisible hand maximizes social 
welfare by allocating goods and services to those consumers who value them 
the most.   
A properly functioning invisible hand also should reward good producers and 
punish poor ones.  Consumers allocating their scarce dollars in a competitive 
market will transact with producers who provide the best cost or quality 
options.  Over time, uncompetitive producers should be drummed out of the 
industry by the aggregate but uncoordinated choices of rational and informed 
consumers. 
However, given the transaction costs inherent in the real world, the invisible 
hand can be subject to distortions.  In particular, to the extent information 
                                                     
8 Honestly.com was previously called Unvarnished.  See Evelyn Rusli, Unvarnished: A Clean, 
Well-Lighted Place For Defamation, TECHCRUNCH, Mar. 30, 2010, 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/30/unvarnished-a-clean-well-lighted-place-for-
defamation/.  
9 PlayerBlock is a similar service, tracking undesirable dating prospects by their cellphone 
number.  See Leslie Katz, Is Your Date a Player?  Send a Text and Find Out, CNET News.com, 
Oct. 22, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9802025-7.html.  
10 See Matt Richtel, Sex Trade Monitors a Key Figure’s Woes, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008.  PunterNet 
is another website in this category, providing reviews of  British sex workers.  John Omizek, 
PunterNet Thanks Harriet for Massive Upswing, THE REGISTER, Oct. 5, 2009, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/05/punternet_harman/. 
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about producers is costly to obtain or use, consumers may lack crucial 
information to make accurate decisions.  To that extent, consumers may not be 
able to easily compare producers or their price/quality offerings, in which case 
good producers may not be rewarded and bad producers may not be punished. 
When information is costly, reputational information can improve the operation 
of the invisible hand by helping consumers make better decisions about 
vendors.  In this sense, reputational information acts like an invisible hand 
guiding the invisible hand (an effect I call the “secondary invisible hand”), 
because reputational information can guide consumers to make marketplace 
choices that, in aggregate, effectuate the invisible hand.  Thus, in an information 
economy with transaction costs, reputational information can play an essential 
role in rewarding good producers and punishing poor ones. 
Given this crucial role in marketplace mechanisms, any distortions in 
reputational information may effectively distort the marketplace itself.  In effect, 
it may cause the secondary invisible hand to push the invisible hand in the 
wrong direction, allowing bad producers to escape punishment and failing to 
reward good producers.  To avoid this unwanted consequence, any regulation 
of reputational information needs to be carefully considered to ensure it is 
improving, not harming, marketplace mechanisms. 
Note that the secondary invisible hand is, itself, subject to transaction costs.  It 
is costly for consumers to find and assess the credibility of reputational 
information.  Therefore, reputation systems themselves typically seek to 
establish their own reputation.  I describe the reputation of reputation systems 
as a “tertiary” invisible hand—it is the invisible hand that guides reputational 
information (the secondary invisible hand) to guide the invisible hand of 
individual uncoordinated decisions by marketplace actors (the primary invisible 
hand).  Thus, the tertiary invisible hand allows the reputation system to earn 
consumer trust as a credible source (such as the Wall Street Journal, the New 
York Times or Consumer Reports) or to be drummed out of the market for 
lack of credibility (such as the now-defunct anonymous gossip website 
JuicyCampus).11 
Thinking About Reputation Regulation 
This part explores some ways that the regulatory system interacts with 
reputation systems and some issues caused by those interactions. 
                                                     
11 Matt Ivester, A Juicy Shutdown, JUICYCAMPUS BLOG, Feb. 4, 2009, 
http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/2009/02/juicy-shutdown.html. 
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Regulatory Heterogeneity 
Regulators have taken divergent approaches to reputation systems.  For 
example, consider the three different regulatory schemes governing job 
references, credit reporting databases and consumer review websites: 
 Job references are subject to a mix of statutory (primarily state law) and 
common law tort regulation.   
 Credit reporting databases are statutorily micromanaged through the 
voluminous and detailed Fair Credit Reporting Act.12   
 Consumer review websites are virtually unregulated, and many potential 
regulations of consumer review websites (such as defamation) are 
statutorily preempted. 
 
These different regulatory structures raise some related questions.  Are there 
meaningful distinctions between reputation systems that support heterogeneous 
regulation?  Are there “best practices” we can observe from these 
heterogeneous regulatory approaches that can be used to improve other 
regulatory systems?  These questions are important because regulatory schemes 
can significantly affect the efficacy of reputation systems.  As an example, 
consider the differences between the job reference and online consumer review 
markets.   
A former employer giving a job reference can face significant liability whether 
the reference is positive or negative.13  Giving unfavorable references of former 
employees can lead to defamation or related claims;14 and there may be liability 
for a former employee giving an incomplete positive reference.15   
Employers may be statutorily required to provide certain objective information 
about former employees.16  Otherwise, given the potentially no-win liability 
regime for communicating job references, most knowledgeable employers 
                                                     
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81x. 
13 See Tresa Baldas, A Rash of  Problems over Job References, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 2008 (“Employers 
are finding that they are being sued no matter what course they take; whether they give a bad 
reference, a good reference or stay entirely silent.”). 
14 1-2 EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 2.05 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2008) (hereinafter 
“EMPLOYMENT SCREENING”). 
15 Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 14 Cal. 4th 1066 (1997). 
16 These laws are called “service letter statutes.”  See EMPLOYMENT SCREENING, supra note 14.  
Germany has a mandatory reference law requiring employers to furnish job references, but 
in response German employers have developed an elaborate system for coding the 
references.  Matthew W. Finkin & Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Solving the Employee Reference 
Problem, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 387 (2009). 
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refuse to provide any subjective recommendations of former employees, 
positive or negative.17   
To curb employers’ tendency towards silence, many states enacted statutory 
immunities to protect employers from lawsuits over job references.18  However, 
the immunities have not changed employer reticence, which has led to a virtual 
collapse of the job reference market.19  As a result, due to mis-calibrated 
regulation, the job reference market fails to provide reliable reputational 
information. 
In contrast, the online consumer review system is one of the most robust 
reputation systems ever.  Millions of consumers freely share their subjective 
opinions about marketplace goods and services, and consumer review websites 
keep proliferating.   
There are several possible reasons why consumer review websites might succeed 
where offline reputation systems might fail.  My hypothesis, discussed in a 
companion essay in this collection, is that the difference is partially explained by 
47 U.S.C. § 230, passed in 1996—at the height of Internet exceptionalism—to 
protect online publishers from liability for third party content.  Section 230 lets 
websites collect and organize individual consumer reviews without worrying 
about crippling legal liability for those reviews.  As a result, consumer review 
websites can motivate consumers to share their opinions and then publish those 
opinions widely—as determined by marketplace mechanisms (i.e., the tertiary 
invisible hand), not concerns about legal liability.   
The success of consumer review websites is especially noteworthy given that 
individual reviewers face the same legal risks that former employers face when 
providing job references, such as the risk of personal liability for publishing 
negative reputational information.  Indeed, numerous individuals have been 
sued for posting negative online reviews.20  As a result, rational actors should 
find it imprudent to submit negative reviews; yet, millions of such reviews are 
published online.  A number of theories might explain this discrepancy, but one 
theory is especially intriguing: Mediating websites, privileged by their own 
liability immunity, find innovative ways to get consumers over their fears of 
legal liability. 
                                                     
17 See Baldas, supra note 13. 
18 The immunizations protect employer statements made in good faith.  EMPLOYMENT 
SCREENING, supra note 14. 
19 See Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 16. 
20 See, e.g., Wendy Davis, Yelp Reviews Spawn At Least Five Lawsuits, MEDIAPOST ONLINE MEDIA 
DAILY, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.printFriendly&art_aid=9877
8; Agard v. Hill, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35014 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
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What lessons can we draw from this comparison?  One possible lesson is that 
reputation systems are too important to be left to the market.  In other words, 
the tertiary invisible hand may not ensure accurate and useful information, or 
the costs of inaccurate information (such as denying a job to a qualified 
candidate) may be too excessive.  If so, extensive regulatory intervention of 
reputation systems may improve the marketplace.   
An alternative conclusion—and a more convincing one to me—is that the 
tertiary invisible hand, aided by a powerful statutory immunity like Section 230, 
works better than regulatory intervention.  If so, we may get better results by 
deregulating reputation systems. 
System Configurations 
Given the regulatory heterogeneity, I wonder if there is an “ideal” regulatory 
configuration for reputation systems, especially given the tertiary invisible hand 
and its salutary effect on publisher behavior.  Two brief examples illustrate the 
choices available to regulators, including the option of letting the marketplace 
operate unimpeded: 
Anti-Gaming.  A vendor may have financial incentives to distort the flow of 
reputational information about it.  This reputational gaming can take many 
forms, including disseminating false positive reports about the vendor,21 
disseminating false negative reports about the vendor’s competitors, or 
manipulating an intermediary’s sorting or weighting algorithm to get more credit 
for positive reports or reduce credit for negative reports.  Another sort of 
gaming can occur when users intentionally flood a reputation system with 
inaccurate negative reports as a form of protest.22   
Do regulators need to curb this gaming behavior, or will other forces be 
adequate?  There are several marketplace pressures that curb gaming, including 
competitors policing each other,23 just as they do in false advertising cases.24  In 
                                                     
21 Lifestyle Lift Holding, Inc. v. RealSelf  Inc., 2:08-cv-10089-PJD-RSW (answer/counterclaims 
filed March 3, 2008), http://www.realself.com/files/Answer.pdf (alleging that Lifestyle 
Lift posted fake positive reviews about its own business to an online review website). 
22 For example, consumers protesting the digital rights management (DRM) in EA’s Spore 
game flooded Amazon’s review site with one-star reviews, even though many of  them 
actually enjoyed the game.  See Austin Modine, Amazon Flash Mob Mauls Spore DRM, THE 
REGISTER, Sept. 10, 2008, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/10/spore_drm_amazon_effect/.  A similar 
protest hit Intuit’s TurboTax 2008 over its increased prices.  See Steven Musil, Amazon 
Reviewers Slam TurboTax Fee Changes, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 7, 2008, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1001_3-10117323-92.html.  
23 See Cornelius v. DeLuca, 2010 WL 1709928 (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 2010) (a marketplace vendor 
sued over alleged shill online reviews posted by competitors). 
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addition, the tertiary invisible hand may encourage reputation systems to 
provide adequate “policing” against gaming.  However, when the tertiary 
invisible hand is weak, such as with fake blog posts where search engines are the 
only mediators,25 government intervention might be worth considering. 
Right of Reply.  A vendor may wish to publicly respond to reputational 
information published about it in an immediately adjacent fashion.  Many 
consumer review websites allow vendors to comment or otherwise reply to 
user-supplied reviews, but not all do.  For example, Yelp initially drew 
significant criticism from business owners who could not effectively reply to 
negative Yelp reviews because of Yelp’s architecture,26 but Yelp eventually 
relented and voluntarily changed its policy.27  As another example, Google 
permitted quoted sources to reply to news articles appearing in Google News as 
a way to “correct the record.”28   
Regulators could require consumer review websites and other reputation 
systems to permit an adjacent response from the vendor.29  But such 
intervention may not be necessary; the tertiary invisible hand can prompt 
reputation systems to voluntarily provide a reply option (as Yelp and Google 
did) when they think the additional information helps consumers.   
Undersupply of Reputational Information 
There are three primary categories of reasons why reputational information may 
be undersupplied. 
                                                                                                                             
24 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, A Puzzle in the Law of  Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
25 See Press Release, New York Office of  the Attorney General, Attorney General Cuomo 
Secures Settlement With Plastic Surgery Franchise That Flooded Internet With False Positive 
Reviews, July 14, 2009, 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/july/july14b_09.html.  
26 See Claire Cain Miller, The Review Site Yelp Draws Some Outcries of  Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 
2009. 
27 See Claire Cain Miller, Yelp Will Let Businesses Respond to Web Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
2009. 
28 See Dan Meredith & Andy Golding, Perspectives About the News from People in the News, 
GOOGLE NEWS BLOG, Aug. 7, 2007, 
http://googlenewsblog.blogspot.com/2007/08/perspectives-about-news-from-
people-in.html. 
29 See Frank A. Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 
(2006); Frank A. Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of  Reply on Search Results, 3 J. BUS. 
& TECH. L. 61 (2008). 
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Inadequate Production Incentives 
Much reputational information starts out as non-public (i.e., “private”) 
information in the form of a customer’s subjective mental impressions about 
his/her interactions with the vendor.  To the extent this information remains 
non-public, it does not help other consumers make marketplace decisions.  
These collective mental impressions represent a vital but potentially 
underutilized social resource.   
The fact that non-public information remains locked in consumers’ heads could 
represent a marketplace failure.  If the social benefit from public reputational 
information exceeds the private benefit from making it public, then 
presumptively there will be an undersupply of public reputational information.  
If so, the government may need to correct this failure by encouraging the 
disclosure of reputational information—such as by creating a tort immunity for 
sites that host that disclosure, as Section 230 does, or perhaps by going further.  
But there already may be market solutions to this problem, as evidenced by the 
proliferation of online review websites eliciting lots of formerly non-public 
reputational information. 
Further, relatively small amounts of publicly disclosed reputational information 
might be enough to properly steer the invisible hand.  For example, the first 
consumer review of a product in a reputation system creates a lot of value for 
subsequent consumers, but the 1,000th consumer review of the same product 
may add very little incrementally.  So even if most consumer impressions remain 
non-public, perhaps mass-market products and vendors still have enough 
information produced to keep them honest.  At the same time, vendors and 
products in the “long tail”30 may have inadequate non-public impressions put 
into the public discourse, creating a valuable opportunity for comprehensive 
reputation systems to fix the omission.  However, reputation systems will tackle 
these obscure marketplace options only when they can keep their costs low 
(given that consumer interest and traffic will, by definition, be low), and 
reputation system deregulation helps reduce both the costs of litigation as well 
as responding to takedown demands. 
  
                                                     
30 Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html. 
302 CHAPTER 4: HAS THE INTERNET FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED ECONOMICS? 
 
Vendor Suppression of Reputational Information 
Vendors are not shy about trying to suppress unwanted consumer reviews ex 
post,31 but vendors might try to suppress such reviews ex ante.  For example, 
one café owner grew so tired of negative Yelp reviews that he put a “No 
Yelpers” sign in his café’s windows.32 
That sign probably had no legal effect, but Medical Justice offers an ex ante 
system to help doctors use preemptive contracts to suppress reviews by their 
patients.  Medical Justice provides doctors with a form agreement that has 
patients waive their rights to post online reviews of the doctor.33  Further, to 
bypass 47 U.S.C. § 230’s protective immunity for online reputation systems that 
might republish such patient reviews, the Medical Justice form prospectively 
takes copyright ownership of any patient-authored reviews.34  (Section 230 does 
not immunize against copyright infringement).  This approach effectively allows 
doctors—or Medical Justice as their designee—to get reputation systems to 
remove any unwanted patient reviews simply by sending a DMCA takedown 
notice.35   
Ex ante customer gag orders may be illegal.  In the early 2000s, the New York 
Attorney General challenged software manufacturer Network Associates’ end 
user license agreement, which said the “customer will not publish reviews of 
this product without prior consent from Network Associates, Inc.”  In 
response, the New York Supreme Court enjoined Network Associates from 
restricting user reviews in its end user license agreement.36  Medical Justice’s 
scheme may be equally legally problematic. 
From a policy standpoint, ex ante customer gag orders pose serious threats to 
the invisible hand.  If they work as intended, they starve reputation systems of 
the public information necessary to facilitate the marketplace.  Therefore, 
                                                     
31 See Eric Goldman, Online Word of  Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK 
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404 (Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis eds.) (2008) (discussing lopsided databases where all negative 
reviews are removed, leaving only positive reviews). 
32 Stefanie Olsen, No Dogs, Yelpers Allowed, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2007, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9759933-7.html.  
33 Lindsey Tanner, Doctors Seek Gag Orders to Stop Patients’ Online Reviews, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-03-05-doctor-
reviews_N.htm.  
34 Michael E. Carbine, Physicians Use Copyright Infringement Threat to Block Patient Ratings on the Web, 
AIS’S HEALTH BUSINESS DAILY, Mar. 30, 2009, 
http://www.aishealth.com/Bnow/hbd033009.html.  
35 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
36 People v. Network Associates, Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
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regulatory efforts might be required to prevent ex ante customer gag orders 
from wreaking havoc on marketplace mechanisms. 
Distorted Decision-Making  
from Reputational Information 
Reputational information generally improves decision-making, but not always.  
Most obviously, reputational information relies on the accuracy of past 
information in predicting future behavior, but this predictive power is not 
perfect.   
First, marketplace actors are constantly changing and evolving, so past behavior 
may not predict future performance.  For example, a person with historically 
bad credit may obtain a well-paying job that puts him or her on good financial 
footing.  Or, in the corporate world, a business may be sold to a new owner 
with different management practices.  In these situations, the predictive 
accuracy of past information is reduced.37 
Second, some past behavior may be so distracting that information consumers 
might overlook other information that has more accurate predictive power.  For 
example, a past crime or bankruptcy can overwhelm the predictive information 
in an otherwise-unblemished track record of good performance. 
Ultimately, a consumer of information must make smart choices about what 
information to consult and how much predictive weight to assign to that 
information.  Perhaps regulation can improve the marketplace’s operation by 
shaping the information that consumers consider.  For example, if some 
information is so highly prejudicial that it is likely to distort consumer decision-
making, the marketplace might work better if we suppress that information 
from the decision-maker.38   
At the same time, taking useful information out of the marketplace could create 
its own adverse distortions of the invisible hand.  Therefore, we should tread 
cautiously in suppressing certain categories of information. 
  
                                                     
37 Cf. Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845 (2003) (describing how companies can mask a 
track record of  bad performance through corporate renaming). 
38 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if  its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of  unfair prejudice, confusion of  the issues, or 
misleading the jury…”).  This fear underlies a French proposal to enact a “right to forget” 
statute.  See David Reid, France Ponders Right-to-Forget Law, BBC CLICK, Jan. 8, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/8447742.stm. 
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Conclusion 
Although “reputation” has been extensively studied in a variety of social science 
disciplines, there has been comparatively little attention paid to how regulation 
affects the flow of reputational information in our economy.  Understanding 
these dynamics would be especially valuable in light of the proliferation of 
Internet-mediated reputation systems and the irresistible temptation to regulate 
novel and innovative reputation systems based on emotion, not necessarily 
sound policy considerations. 
